
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



January 15, 1981

residential Directive PD/NSC-62

TO:

The Vice President

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of The Treasury

The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Energy

Timmy Carter The Director, Office of Management & Budget

The Chairman, Joint Cheifs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

(U) Modifications in U.S. National Strategy

I set forth U.S. National Strategy in 1977 in Presidential Directive/ NSC-18. It remains our strategy, but in light of increased projection of Soviet power which threatens U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf region, it has become necessary through a series of individual directives to modify emphasis and priority in the strategy. Directive will elaborate and codify our progress in building a security framework for the Persian Gulf. (S)

Greater Readiness Required

Given the increased risk of major local or regional conflict involving key U.S. interests in the 1980s we must increase the priority given to readiness in defense resource allocations.

Shifts in Priority for General Purpose Forces

Presidential Directive/NSC-18 put the focus for our general purpose forces on Europe but also called for capabilities for contingencies in Korea and the Persian Gulf region. Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan have, in the interim, increased substantially the threat to our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, the chaotic situation following the Iranian revolution, the Iraq-Iran war and the intensifying intra-Arab and Israeli-Arab tensions have increased the instability in the region. This has also increased the risk to U.S. and Allied interests, both directly and by giving the Soviets added opportunities for interference. At the same time, our success in normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China has improved our strategic position in East Asia. Given the danger that Soviet success in asserting influence over the oil producing status of the Persian Gulf region could undermine the viability of NATO and Japan, cause enormous economic disruptions in Europe, Japan, and the

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Review on January 14, 2001 Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

Approved For Release 2008/08/07: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060035-8

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United States, higher priority must be given to developing adequate strategic lift, general purpose forces and facilities access for Persian Gulf contingencies. (S)

While NATO will retain first call on force deployments in peacetime for wartime operations, the Persian Gulf shall have highest priority for improvement of strategic lift and general purpose forces in the Five Year Defense Program. This priority calls for continued improvement of relations with the People's Republic of China, accelerated growth of Japan's defense capabilities as a contribution to U.S.-Japanese security ties, improved relations with the ASEAN states, and greater progress in getting our NATO Allies to bear a larger share of the burden of defense in Europe. (S)

Soviet projection of power in the Caribbean region with Cuba's assistance over the past two years has created another area of increased security concern. In support of the objectives of Presidential Directive/NSC-52, it is necessary to achieve quietly a stronger military presence in the region by gradual shifts in our military exercise activities and basing of U.S. forces in the Southeastern part of the United States and its territories in the region which will be perceived by Cuba and the Soviet Union as evidence of our determination to limit Soviet and Cuban regional influence. (S)

Sharing the Security Burden with Our Allies

for Allies start

Because the Soviet military buildup and the projection of Soviet military power have increased our strategic requirements, we must make more effort and devise better ways to share the economic and military burden with our Allies. We must insist that our European Allies undertake the programs and make available the resources needed to make up for the reduction in U.S. force commitments caused by our effort oriented toward the Persian Gulf. At the same time, certain of our Allies, particularly the British, French, and Australians, should contribute forces to the security framework for the Persian Gulf. (S)

Germany, other members of NATO, ANZUS, and Japan should contribute non-military resources such as economic assistance to the security framework. Two countries which flank Southwest Asia and would be most important recipients of this economic aid -- as well as of military aid from selected donors -- would be Turkey and Pakistan. (S)

Our European and regional Allies should provide overflight, transit and staging for U.S. forces moving to Southwest Asia. Procedures should be established to facilitate overflight and refueling clearances. (S)

Arms Control

Arms control negotiations which promise to constrain Soviet forces -- strategic and general purpose -- and particularly to limit resources that both sides must commit to the strategic competition will be pursued vigorously. This latter element of our strategy must be exploited

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to the extent possible for alleviating both the economic burdens of defense and for reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. (S)

Persian Gulf Security Framework

Presidential Directive/NSC-63 elaborates U.S. strategy for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia region. (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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